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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an extension of Spenglers (1950) analysis
to successive oligopolies, to study the e¤ects of entry in the downstream
and upstream markets. Free entry is analysed using replica economies à
la Debreu and Scarf (1963). We nd that free entry may have di¤erent
e¤ects in the upstream and in the downtream market. Namely, the usual
convergence of the price to the correspondoing marginal cost only occurs
in the downstream market.
Keywords: successive oligopolies, free entry
JEL classication: D43, L10, L13
We are grateful to Nathalie Sonnac, Paul Belleamme, Didier Laussel, Yves Smeers, the
editor Makoto Yano and to an anonymus referee for thoughtful comments that have improved
our work. We would also like to thank for their useful suggestions the participants of seminars
in CORE, Luxembourg, Lecce, Amsterdam, Oporto and LEI, Paris.
yCORE, Université Catholique de Louvain.
zCREA, University of Luxembourg. corresponding author: skerdilajda.zanaj@uni.lu
1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of entry in a setting where there is an
interaction between upstream and downstream rms, i.e. successive markets. In
a seminal paper, Spengler (1950) introduces the basic idea of successive markets,
but he analyzes the simplest possible case to capture the interlink between the
downstream and upstream markets: namely, the case of bilateral monopoly.
And, he ignores the phenomenon of free entry in the two markets. In fact, his
interests is mainly invested in the so called double marginalization phenomenon
and the resulting e¤ects of vertical collusive agreements between the upstream
and downstream monopolist.
In order to analyse entry in successive markets, we consider here more com-
plex structures in both markets than a simply bilateral monopoly. In particular,
the concept of industry equilibrium is extended to frameworks embodying an
arbitrary number of rms both in the upstream and downstream markets. This
extension has been already considered in the existing literature after Spengler,
but with the exclusive purpose of analysing vertical collusive agreements, as
in Salop and Sche¤man (1987), Salinger (1988), Ordover, Salop and Sche¤man
(1990), and Gaudet and Van Long (1996) among others.
In the present paper, we neglect the analysis of vertical agreements and
double marginalization but rather examine the e¤ects of free entry when there
are interactions between upstream and downstream markets. Upstream rms
select non cooperatively the quantities of their output, but the output of the
upstream rms serves as input in the production of the nal good in the down-
stream market. Hence, the link between the two markets follows from the fact
that the downstream rmsunit cost appears as the unit revenue for the up-
stream ones : the price paid for a unit of input for the rms in the former
constitutes the unit receipt for the rms in the latter. This gives rise to two
games. In the upstream game, input rms declare the amount of input they
supply; in the downstream game, downstream rms select the amount of input
to use in the production of the output. Thus, ultimately they select the level of
the nal good to supply to the nal consumers. The input price in equilibrium
makes its demand and supply equal.
The main nding of the paper can be summarized as follows. Free entry
of rms in both markets does not always entail the usual convergence for the
input price to adjust to its marginal cost. While, the convergence towards the
marginal cost is always obtained in the downstream market. Our result is in line
with Cournot (1838) and Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), because the quantities of
input corresponding to Cournot equilibria in our model converge to the quantity
of input corresponding to the competitive equilibrium. The novelty brought by
our analysis is that the corresponding sequence of Cournot equilibrium prices
does not converge to the input marginal cost. The reason is that in successive
markets the marginal cost for the rms who produce the nal good is not the
xed marginal cost to produce the input, as in Cournot (1838). Here, their
marginal cost is determined by the input price at the industry equilibrium,
which is a conseguence of the market power in both the downstream and the
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upstream markets. Free entry with the same speed of rms in both markets
a¤ects market power in each market di¤erently, therefore, the input demand
and the input supply are a¤ected di¤erently by the entry of new rms. As a
conseguence, the input price, that clears the input market, does not necessarly
lead to an input price that is equal to the technological marginal cost to produce
the input. Nevertheless, this input price does not preclude the limit economy to
be in a Pareto optimal state simultaneously in both markets. This discrepancy
between marginal cost and input price may disappear when the upstream market
is replicated innitely faster than the downstream one. In other words, the
market power of upstream rms who x the input price should be diluted much
faster than the downstream rmsone in order to force the competitive input
price! When free entry takes place only in the upstream market, the input
demand is determined by a given xed number of rms. While, the input
supply is a conseguence of the diluted market power of upstream rms. As a
result, the input price does converge to its marginal cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the model, assuming a given number of rms in the upstream and downstream
markets. In Section 3, explores the industry equilibria and the e¤ects of free
entry. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider two successive markets, the downstream and upstream market, with
n downstream rms i; i = 1; :::n; in the rst, producing the nal good, and m
upstream rms j, j = 1; :::m; in the second, producing and selling the input. The
n downstream rms face a demand function (Q) in the downstream market,
withQ denoting the aggregate quantity of the nal good: Firm i owns technology
fi(z) to produce the nal good, with zi denoting the quantity of the sole input
used in the production process and bought by rm i in the upstream market.
Them upstream rms each produce the input z at a total cost Cj(z); j = 1; ::;m:
We assume that this situation gives rise to two games. The players in the rst
game, the downstream game, are the n downstream rms who choose their input
strategies zi(p) in order to reach a Cournot equilibrium in the downstream
market, while the players in the second, the upstream game, are the upstream
rms with input strategies sj(p) conditional on the input price p: The two
markets are linked to each other as follows. In the downstream game, rms select
strategically the input levels zi(p) which determines their individual output level
f(zi(p)) of input via the production function f: Consequently, the downstream
rms while behaving strategically in the nal good market, are assumed to
be price takers in the input market. Faced with the input demand schedule
ni=1zi(p) resulting from aggregating individual demands, rms in the upstream
game select non cooperatively the quantities of input. The choice of input
quantities, given the input demand ni=1zi(p); determines the input market price
p that satises
ni=1zi(p
) = mj=1sj(p
):
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The payo¤ in the downstream game for the ith rm at the vector of strategies
(zi(p); z i(p)) obtains as
i(zi; z i; p) =  (fi(zi) + k 6=ifk(zk)) fi(zi))  pzi:
Given these payo¤s, the best reply, zi(z i; p) of rm i in the downstream game,
obtains as a solution (whenever it exists) to the problem
Max
zi
i(zi; z i; p):
A Nash equilibrium in the downstream game (whenever it exists) writes as an
input vector (z1(p)); :::; z

n(p)); where z

i (p) solves
Max
zi
i(zi; z

 i(p)); p)
for all i; i = 1; ::; n:
In the upstream game, rms select their selling strategies sj(p); j = 1; ::;m:
Assuming a Cournot equilibrium in the downstream game, they face a total
demand ni=1z

i (p) of input. Accordingly, from the market clearing condi-
tion ni=1zi(p
) = mj=1sj(p
); we obtain the inverse input demand function
p(mj=1sj) and thus, write the payo¤ function  j(sj ; s j) of rm j in the up-
stream game as
 j(sj ; s j) = p(mj=1sj)sj   Cj(sj)
whenever it is dened for all admissible values of p. Denote by (s1(p
); :::; sm(p
))
the vector of input quantities supplied at the Nash equilibrium in the upstream
game (whenever it exists). Thus, nally we obtain
Denition An industry equilibrium is a (m+n)-tuple vector (z1(p
); :::;
zn(p
)); s1(p
); :::; sm(p
)) and an input price p such that (i) (z1(p
); :::; zn(p
))
is a Nash equilibrium in the downstream game (ii) (s1(p
); :::; sm(p
)) is a Nash
equilibrium in the upstream one, and (iii) p satises ni=1z

i (p
) = mj=1s

j (p
):
An industry equilibrium is a situation in which both the downstream and
upstream markets exhibit Cournot equilibria, and where the quantity of input
demanded at equilibrium in the rst market exactly balances the quantity sup-
plied in the second.
3 Exploring industry equilibria
It is di¢ cult to analyze industry equilibria at the full level of generality. This is
why we try to get some insights into the e¤ects of entry on industry equilibria
by considering explicit functions. Downstream rms share the same technology
f(zi) to produce the nal good, namely
f(zi) =
p
zi:
Moreover, we assume that the n downstream rms face a linear demand (Q) =
1   Q in the downstream market: We assume a linear demand function in the
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downstream market, as usually in the literature on successive markets (see for
instance Salinger (1988) and Gaudet and Van Long (1996)). As for the m
upstream rms, each produces the input z using the same linear technology
characterized by the same linear total cost Cj(sj) = sj ; j = 1; ::;m: As in the
general formulation above, we assume that this situation gives rise to two games.
The players in the rst game are the n downstream rms with strategies zi(p),
while the players in the second are the m upstream rms with input strategies
sj(p):
The prots of the ith downstream rm at the vector of strategies (zi; z i)
obtains as
i(zi; z i) = (1 pzi   k 6=ipzk)pzi   pzi:
From prot maximization with respect to zi, we get the demand function for
the input
ni=1z

i (p) = nz
(p) =
n
(n+ 2p+ 1)
2 ; i = 1:::n:
At a given n-tuple (s1(p); :::; sj(p); ::sm(p)) of input strategies chosen by the
upstream rms in the upstream game, the input price clearing the upstream
market must satisfy
nz(p) =
n
(n+ 2p+ 1)
2 = 
m
j=1sj(p)
so that we get the inverse input demand p(mj=1sj) as
p(mj=1sj) =
r
n
4mj=1sj
  n+ 1
2
: (1)
It follows that substituting (2) into (1), the payo¤ function of the upstream rm
j in the upstream game is
 j(sj ; s j) = (
r
n
4mj=1sj
  n+ 1
2
)sj   sj ;
Notice that the prot function  j(sj ; s j) is concave in the input quantity so
that we can use the rst order necessary and su¢ cient conditions to characterize
an equilibrium. Accordingly, at the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the upstream
game, we obtain
s(m;n) =
n (2m  1)2
4m3 (2 + 1 + n)
2 :
Hence the prot  j(m;n) of an upstream rm at the symmetric equilibrium of
the upstream game obtains as
 j(m;n) =
n(2m  1)
8 (n+ 1)m3
:
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Finally, the equilibrium price p(m;n) in the input market obtains as
p(m;n) =
n+ 1 + 4m
2 (2m  1) :
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities
z of input bought by each downstream rm, we get
z(m;n) =
(2m  1)2
4m2 (2 + n+ 1)
2
so that, the optimal nal good quantity obtains as
f(zi (m;n)) = f(z
(m;n)) =
2m  1
2m (2 + n+ 1)
:
Therefore, the resulting nal good price (m;n) in the downstream market
obtains as
(m;n) = 1  n (2m  1)
2m (2 + n+ 1)
: (2)
The prot i(m;n) of a downstream rm at equilibrium in the corresponding
game is thus equal to
i(m;n) =
(4m + 4m+ n  1) (2m  1)
8m2 (2 + n+ 1)
2 :
Notice that the prot of a downstream rm can decrease as entry of new rms
takes place in the upstream market, @i(m;n)@m 7 0. Conventional wisdom sug-
gests that with more rms in the upstream market, input price must decline,
leading to a decline in costs of nal good. Consequently, per-rm prot in the
downstream market should increase. But in successive oligopolies, an increase
of the number of upstream rms m, has an indirect strategic e¤ect on revenue
of each downstream rm and a direct e¤ect on the input cost. Thus, the overall
e¤ect on the downstream prot can be of either sign.
3.1 Free entry
In this section, we examine the e¤ects of entry on industry equilibria in success-
ive markets. We choose to model entry by replicating r-times the basic economy,
as in Debreu and Scarf (1963). In the r-th replica, downstream market demand
is given by r(1   Q) and there are rn downstream and rm upstream rms.
Notice that, in the rth-replica, the prices at which demand is equal to supply
both in the downstream and upstream markets, do not depend on the number
r; but depend only on m and n: Indeed, at the symmetric equilibrium in the
upstream market, the input quantities supplied by the m upstream rms have
to be multiplied by r in the rth-replica; similarly for the quantities demanded by
the n downstream rms in the downstream market. Consequently, the equality
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of supply and demand in the upstream market eliminates the r  factor in each
side of the equality. A similar reasoning applies for the symmetric price equilib-
rium in the downstream market. It follows that the study of the behavior of the
upstream and downstream markets when the number of replications increases is
equivalent to the study of the limit equilibrium prices and quantities obtained
in the previous section when the number of rms is rn and rm ; instead of n
and m; in each market, respectively.
We consider successively the following situations.
3.1.1 Perfect competition
We compute
lim
r!1
(rm; rn) = 0
and
lim
r!1 p
(rm; rn) =
1
4
n
m
+ :
Furthermore we get
lim
r!1 f(z
(rm; rn)) = 0:
Therefore,
Proposition 1 Free entry in both markets does not make the input prices, cor-
responding to the industry equilibria, to converge to the upstream rmsmarginal
cost. However, the sequence of the corresponding prices of the nal good does
converge to the competitive price.
The usual practice when increasing the number of rms in the market con-
sists in comparing the resulting price with a xed marginal cost. The novelty
here is that the marginal cost of the downstream rms does not remain xed
when increasing the number of rms in the downstream and upstream mar-
kets simultaneously. Importantly, notice that, whatever r, the marginal cost of
producing the input, which is equal to , is lower than the input price by an
amount of 14
n
m . This looks as a surprise since this context, for large values of
r; corresponds closely to perfect competition. It is as if the downstream rms
would be charged a constant tax per unit of input over the marginal cost of pro-
ducing the input, : In fact, when r is close to1; f(z(rm; rn)) is close to zero,
implying an innitesimal individual demand for input from each downstream
rm and, accordingly, a marginal product of the input which tends to innity
with r: In particular, if the price of input were set at the marginal cost ; the
quantity of input demanded by the downstream rms would exceed the quant-
ity which would be o¤ered by the upstream rms at the same price, preventing
thereby the equality of supply and demand, as required by the denition of a
competitive equilibrium:The total quantity demanded by the downstream rms
at the downstream Cournot equilibrium if p =  obtains from the solution of
the problem Max
zi
(1   pzi   k 6=ipzk)pzi   pzi from which we easily obtain:
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nz = n
2
(n+2+2)2 :Thus limr!1 frnz
g = 1: On the other hand, the amount of
input o¤ered by the upstream rms at price  is n
2( 12++
1
2 )
2 : This amount tends
to zero when rm and rn tend to inifnity, and not to 1:
Free entry with the same speed of rms in both markets a¤ects market power
in each market di¤erently, therefore, the input demand and the input supply are
a¤ected di¤erently by the entry of new rms. As a conseguence, the input price,
that clears the input market, does not necessarly lead to an input price that is
equal to the technological marginal cost to produce the input. Notice however
that, even though upstream rms get the amount of the tax, it does not prevent
the quantity of input exchanged in the input market to correspond exactly to
the quantity required to produce an aggregate nal good corresponding to the
competitive equilibrium nal good. More than that: the burden of this tax is
even required in order to induce downstream rms to reduce their input demand
in order to produce exactly the competitive equilibrium nal good level! The
presence of this subsidy does not bring any extra prots to the upstream rms
themselves: their prot tends to zero when r tends to innity. Consequently,
this limit value of the input price, including the existence of the subsidy, does
not preclude the limit economy to be in a Pareto optimal state simultaneously
in both markets. The existence of this transfer, through the input price from
the downstream to the upstream rms, reveals the interlinkage between markets
resulting from the simultaneous increase in the number of rms in both of them.
Finally notice that if the economy would be replicated at a di¤erent speed in
the downstream and upstream markets, this discrepancy between marginal cost
and input price may disappear. In fact, when the upstream market is replicated
innitely faster than the downstream one, this discrepancy disappears at the
limit. For instance, when the downstream market is replicated at speed r, while
the upstream market is replicated at speed r2, the limit input price is equal
to the marginal cost . In other words, the power of upstream rms should
be diluted much faster than the downstream rmsone in order to force the
competitive outcome !
This discrepancy between marginal cost and input price may disappear when
the upstream market is replicated innitely faster than the downstream one. In
other words, the market power of upstream rms who x the input price should
be diluted much faster than the downstream rmsone in order to force the
competitive input price!
3.1.2 Upstream competition and downstream oligopoly
We compute
lim
r!1 f
(rm; n)g = 1 + 2
n+ 1 + 2
and
lim
r!1 fp
(rm; n)g = :
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Proposition 2 Free entry only in the upstream market yields
(i) the equilibrium input price converges to upstream rmsmarginal cost;
(ii) the equilibrium price of the nal good converges to the nal good price
1+2
1+n+2 corresponding to the Cournot equilibrium with n downstream rms pro-
ducing the good at a unit cost .
Thus, di¤erently from proposition 1, proposition 2 ts the standard asymp-
totic results obtained in the usual Cournot framework of a single market. In
fact, the e¤ects that are present when n and m tend simultaneously to innity,
disappear when n is xed: the production level of each downstream rm does
not tend to zero, so that, whateverm; the marginal product of the input remains
bounded away from innity. Then no tax is needed to dampen the incentive to
overproduce the nal good.
3.1.3 Downstream competition and upstream oligopoly
We compute
lim
r!1 f
(m; rn)g = 1
2m
and
lim
r!1 fp
(m; rn)g =1:
Proposition 3 Free entry in downstream market makes the price of the nal
good to converge to the marginal cost of producing the nal good when m rms
are operating in the input market. In this case, the input price gets arbitrary
large.
This immediately follows from the fact that the marginal cost of produ-
cing the nal good at the equilibrium in the downstream market when m rms
operate in the upstream market is equal to 2pf(z); with p = p(m;n) and
f(z) = f(z(m;n)): The price of the nal good exactly reects the market
power existing in the upstream market, which is transferred in the downstream
market through its dependence on the number of upstream rms, m: This sheds
some further light on the interaction between the two succesuve markets un-
der Cournot competition. Even if the competitive conditions are met in the
downstream market, since MC = (m;n); the nal good price encompasses
the non competitiveness in the input market. The usual analysis of Cournot
competition in a market does not allow this type of consideration because the
relationship of costs to market power in the input market cannot be taken into
account when the cost function is exogenous.
In fact, as in the case of pure competition considered above, when n is close
to1; f(z(m;n)) is again close to zero, implying an innitesimal individual de-
mand of input from each downstream rm and, accordingly, a marginal product
of the input which tends to innity with m and n: This leads downstream rms
demand to increase beyond any limit, forcing in turn the input price to increase
itself beyond any limit when the number of upstream rms remains xed.
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4 Conclusion
Our exploration of industry equilibria deserves to be continued. First, as in the
existing literature, we have kept the assumption of price taking agents in the
demand side of the markets. This assumption is not very satisfactory because
it is di¢ cult to justify the fact that an economic agent behaves strategically
in one market but not in another. A full treatment would require downstream
rms behaving strategically simultaneously in the downstream and upstream
markets. This constitutes the next point on our research agenda. Another av-
enue for potential research would consist in analyzing the stability of collusive
agreements, as in dAspremont et al. (1983), using the framework identied
in the present paper. Furthermore, the analysis could be extended to chains
of technology-linked markets and to technological contexts involving more than
one factor. Finally, it would be very natural to study in depth the e¤ects of
collusive agreements among downstream and upstream rms, in the framework
of successive markets. The above analysis provides a good setup to cast some
important issues studied in the literature. All this looks like a promising re-
search territory for a better understanding of industry equilibria in technology
linked markets.
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5 Appendix: Equilibrium input supply
The prot of an upstream rm  j at the vector of strategies writes as
 j(sj ; s j) = p(sj ; s j)sj   sj ;
with p(sj ; s j) such that
P
j sj(p) =
P
i zi(p); namely
p(sj ; s j) =
1
4 ( + 1)
 
k   n  2 + 2k   2n   2+p
(n k)pPk 6=j skP
k 6=j sk
(2 + 1)
!
:
Denote by a the value k n 2+2k 2n 24(+1) and by b the expression
p
(n k)(2+1)
4(+1) :
Accordingly, the payo¤ of the j-th upstream rm writes as
 j(sj ; s j) =
0@a+ b
qP
k 6=j skP
k 6=j sk
1A sj   sj :
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Taking the rst derivative with respect to sj ; we get
a   + bp
s(m  h)  
1
2
b
s
s
p
s(m  h) + s (m  h  1)ps(m  h) = 0
in a symmetric equilibrium. Let us make the change of variable
p
s (m  h) =
x; and let us solve the equation a    + bx   s2 bsx+s(m h 1)x = 0 in two steps.
The solution in x obtains as
x =
(2m  2h  1) b
2 (   a) (m  h) :
Thus, using the denition of x; we can solve the equation in s; namely,
s =
1
4
b2 (2m  2h  1)2
(m  h)3 (   a)2 :
substituting back for a = k n 2+2k 2n 24(+1) and b =
p
(n k)(2+1)
4(+1) in the ex-
pression of s(n;m); we get s(n;m) as in the paper.
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